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This paper describes an analytically tractable model of balanced growth that allows for extensive
heterogeneity in the technologies used by ﬁrms. Firms enter with ﬁxed characteristics that determine
their initial technologies and the levels of ﬁxed costs required to stay in business. Each ﬁrm produces
ad i ﬀerent good, and ﬁrms are subject to productivity and demand shocks that are independent
across ﬁrms and over time. Firms exit when revenues are too low relative to ﬁxed costs. Conditional
on ﬁxed ﬁrm characteristics, the stationary distribution of ﬁrm size satisﬁes a power law for all sizes
above the size at which new ﬁrms enter. The tail of the size distribution decays very slowly if
the growth rate of the initial productivity of potential entrants is not too far above the growth
rate of productivity inside incumbent ﬁrms. In one interpretation, this diﬀerence in growth rates
can be related to learning-by-doing inside ﬁrms and spillovers of the information generated as a
result. As documented in a companion paper, heterogeneity in ﬁxed ﬁrm characteristics together
with idiosyncratic ﬁrm productivity growth can generate entry, exit, and growth rates, conditional
on age and size, in line with what is observed in the data.
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This paper is motivated by evidence on the size distribution of ￿rms in the U.S. presented
in Axtell (2001). Using 1997 data on ￿rms from the U.S. Census, Axtell (2001) ￿nds
that the log of the right tail probabilities of the log-size distribution, with ￿rm size
measured by employment, is on a virtual straight line with a slope of −1.059.F i g u r e1
below shows the data for 2001.1 This evidence suggests that the distribution of ￿rm size
is well approximated by a Pareto distribution with right tail probabilities of the form
1/Sθ with θ ≈ 1.05,w h e r eS is ￿rm size as measured by employment. The remarkable
￿t of this distribution for the log-size distribution of ￿rms, at least for ￿rms that are
not too small, has been documented and interpreted before by many, and perhaps most
notably by Simon and Bonini (1958) and Ijiri and Simon (1964). Researchers as far back
as Gribrat (1931) have tried to connect the shape of the observed size distribution to
data on ￿rm growth, exit and entry. The mechanism elaborated in this paper is most
like the one sketched by Gabaix (1999). Axtell (2001) showed that the older empirical
￿ndings hold up well in recent Census data based on a large universe of ￿rms. A useful
survey of the literature on ￿rm size and Gibrat￿s law is given in Sutton (1997). Gabaix
(1999) contains extensive discussions of the literature on probability models that give
rise to power laws, and their application in economics.
This paper constructs an analytically tractable and fully speci￿ed general equilibrium
model that is consistent with the evidence just cited, and that is amenable to a more
detailed comparison with data, going beyond the size information displayed in Figure 1.
This adds to a growing literature that is discussed further below. The economy described
incorporates several dimensions of ￿rm heterogeneity that can aﬀect ￿rm size, and the
paper characterizes the circumstances in which one can expect an approximate power
law to emerge, in spite of factors such as scale economies and economic geography that
can in￿uence ￿rm size. In contrast to most of the literature, the model does not rely on
Cobb-Douglas technologies to generate balanced growth. A companion paper (Luttmer
[2004]) describes the extent to which the model is consistent with data on entry, exit
and growth of U.S. Manufacturing plants.
1The data shown in Figure 1 summarize a population of 5,657,774 U.S. ￿rms in 2001. The largest
size category, that of 10,000 employees and over, still contains 930 ￿rms. There is a size category of zero
employees (in March of 2001) accounting for 703,837 ￿rms that is not shown. The line is ￿tted by least
squares using all the available size categories of 5 employees and higher. The data are originally from
the U.S. Census Bureau, and were obtained from the Small Business Administration internet site, and
from the Statistics of U.S. Businesses site of the U.S. Census Bureau (the size categories 5,000-9,999
and 10,000 and over).
















) θ  = 1.0523 
s = ln(employment) 
z(s) = ln(# of firms above s) 
Figure 1: Size Distribution of U.S. Firms in 2001
The economy is one with diﬀerentiated ￿nal goods and monopolistic competition. A ￿rm
is identi￿ed with the good of which it is the sole producer. Firms can employ capital and
eﬀective labor using a ￿rm-speci￿c technology that exhibits constant returns to scale.
Operating a ￿rm requires a ￿xed cost, and these ￿xed costs can also vary across ￿rms.
Firms experience labor-augmenting improvements in the technology they operate at a
rate that is common to all ￿rms. The idiosyncratic total factor productivity of a ￿rm and
the weight of its diﬀerentiated commodity in the utility function evolve stochastically
over time. The stochastic process of these technology and preference shocks is such that
￿rms will eventually close down with probability one. New ￿rms with new technology
parameters can enter at a certain cost.
The economy described here has two sources of growth: labor-augmenting technolog-
ical progress that can be interpreted as accumulation of human capital, and total factor
productivity growth in the production of ￿nal goods. The aggregate technology for ￿nal
g o o d si m p l i e db yt h ep r o c e s so fe n t r ya n de x i to f￿rms is generally not Cobb-Douglas.
In a one-sector version of the economy, this would rule out a balanced growth path in
which the selection over time of more productive ￿rms leads to total factor productivity
growth in the production of ￿nal goods. This paper therefore adopts a two-sector spec-
i￿cation, as in Uzawa (1961), in which ￿nal goods are used only for consumption and a
separate technology determines capital accumulation. The production function for new
capital depends on labor and existing capital that is not in use for the production of
￿nal goods. It exhibits constant returns to scale and must be suﬃciently productive.
2The shares of aggregate output paid to capital, labor and owners of ￿rms are constant
along the balanced growth path. The price of capital goods in terms of the composite
￿nal consumption good rises at the rate of total factor productivity growth in the ￿nal
goods producing sector. Wages and ￿rm values rise at the sum of this rate and the rate
of labor-augmenting technological progress.
The process of entry and exit leads to a stationary distribution of ￿rm characteris-
tics if the growth rate of total factor productivity inside a typical ￿rm is not too high
compared to the rate at which the technology available to new entrants improves over
time. This means that incumbents eventually lose out to more recent entrants. In an
economy without random productivity shocks, this would lead to an age-size distribu-
tion with the property that the most recent entrant is the largest and most productive.
The economies described by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Romer (1990) have this
feature. Here instead, random preference and productivity shocks give rise to a selection
mechanism, as in Jovanovic (1982), that can make the more eﬃcient incumbents large
and pro￿table relative to average incumbents and new entrants, even though all incum-
bents will ultimately fall behind and exit. Greenwood and Jovanovic (2001) emphasize
this as an important feature of plant-level data.
Conditional on ￿xed characteristics, the equilibrium distribution of pro￿tability and
size is Pareto to the right of the point at which ￿rms enter. This Pareto distribution will
have the thick right tail observed in Figure 1 (θ a b o v eb u tc l o s et o1), and survivors of the
selection process will be particularly large, if incumbents are not at a great disadvantage
relative to new entrants, in terms of the rate at which their technology improves over
time. Reducing this disadvantage will cause θ to decrease, and once it reaches 1 the
equilibrium described in this paper will cease to exist. Zipf￿s law ￿tail probabilities of
the form 1/S￿ is only a limiting case of the model. As this limit is approached, the
number of ￿rms will become arbitrarily small, and aggregate expenditures on ￿xed and
entry costs will converge to zero. In the context of the economy described here, Zipf￿s
law cannot hold if these expenditures are non-negligible.
T h er e l a t i v es i z eo fe n t r ya n d￿xed costs determines the range over which the size
distribution conditional on ￿xed characteristics will be Pareto. The lower the entry costs
are relative to ￿xed costs, the lower must be equilibrium pro￿ts following entry. The
typical entrant will then have a pro￿tability that is close to the level at which it is optimal
to exit, and much of the range of the distribution will be Pareto. The overall stationary
size distribution will be approximately Pareto if the post-entry selection mechanism
dominates the eﬀects of initial heterogeneity in ￿xed characteristics among entrants.
3The key parameter of the model is the diﬀerence between the rate at which the tech-
nology available to new entrants improves over time and the rate at which the produc-
tivity of incumbents is expected to improve. This parameter can be made endogenous by
introducing a spillover of technology from surviving incumbents to potential entrants. If
this spillover is very strong, then new entrants will constantly drive relatively ineﬃcient
incumbents out of business by making use of the technology improvements generated by
surviving incumbents. Growth will be fast and the size distribution of ￿rms will have
a very thin tail. The data in Figure 1 instead display a very thick tail for which the
theoretical size distribution only just has a ￿nite mean. In the context of the model
presented here, this means that spillovers from incumbent to entering ￿rms cannot be
too strong.
The crucial assumption used in this paper is that the rate of labor augmenting
technological progress is the same for all ￿rms. Along the balanced growth path, the
rental price of capital in terms of labor decreases at this rate. Not counting ￿xed costs,
any ￿nal goods producer with a constant returns technology will therefore choose a ratio
of capital over eﬀe c t i v el a b o rt h a ti sc o n s t a n to v e rt i m e .F i r m sw i t hd i ﬀerent technologies
will choose diﬀerent ratios, but the model predicts no variation over the life of a ￿rm.
Related Literature The economy described in this paper can easily be adapted to in-
corporate decreasing returns of the form introduced by Lucas (1978) to reconcile Gibrat￿s
law with scale economies. This paper follows Atkeson and Kehoe (2002) in requiring
￿rms to incur ￿xed costs continuously, or be shut down irreversibly. An alternative
mechanism for ￿rm exit that may be tractable is along the lines of Hopenhayn (1992).
As in Melitz (2003), this paper uses market power instead of decreasing returns. A
tractable form of decreasing returns that diﬀers from the span-of-control model of Lucas
(1978) is discussed in the concluding remarks. The importance of selection in shaping
the distribution of ￿rm characteristics is central in Jovanovic (1982). As in Parente and
Prescott (2000) and Lagos (2001), the economy described here has implications for the
relation between barriers to entry and the level of total factor productivity.
This paper is perhaps most closely related to the work of Gabaix (1999) on cities,
Klette and Kortum (2003) on ￿rms, and by Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2003, 2004) on
cities and ￿rms.
Gabaix (1999) describes how a geometric Brownian motion with a re￿ecting barrier
gives rise to a power law and shows the precise circumstances under which this will lead
to Zipf￿s law. He uses this to construct a model of cities and explain evidence on the
4size distribution of cities. The entry and exit process described here does not lead to a
re￿ecting barrier, but to a ￿return process￿ according to which ￿rms exit below some
barrier and enter at a point above this barrier. The two processes are closely related,
and the limiting argument used by Gabaix (1999) will be discussed below.
A thought-provoking paper by Eeckhout (2004) suggests strongly that the cross-
sectional distribution of city sizes in the US is much better approximated by a log-
normal distribution than by the Pareto distribution with θ =1that gave rise to Zipf￿s
law. An important diﬀerence between the Eeckhout (2004) data and earlier studies is
the inclusion of small cities. As a result, the empirical size density of cities eventually
comes down for relatively small cities, as does the log-normal density, and in contrast
to the Pareto density. By itself this feature of the data does not rule out the model
described here as a model for cities. Entry and ￿x e dc o s t si m p l ya nu p w a r ds l o p i n g
size density at low size levels. Nevertheless, the log-normal distribution may still be a
better approximation for city size data than the distribution for ￿rm sizes derived in this
paper.2 The populations of cities and ￿rms experience very diﬀerent levels of entry and
exit. Both are very small for cities, and quite substantial for ￿rms. Incumbent cities
appear to have more of an edge over entrants than incumbent ￿rms.
The economy described here has many elements in common with Klette and Kortum
(2004), who construct a quality ladder model in which ￿rm growth is the result of
research and development choices made by ￿rms. The economy grows because ￿rms
are able to improve on the quality of existing producers. The spillover described in this
paper to endogenize the diﬀerence in productivity growth rates between incumbents and
entrants has the same eﬀect, provided entrants can start with a technology that is not
too far behind the average in the population of incumbents. Entrants in Klette and
Kortum (2004) are small relative to the average ￿rm, ￿rm growth satis￿es Gibrat￿s law,
and ￿rms are eventually driven out of business with probability one. The resulting size
distribution, where size is measured by the number of goods produced by the ￿rm, is
logarithmic. This distribution is highly skewed, with a monotonically decreasing density.
But a plot as in Figure 1 generates a curve that is concave and that does not asymptote to
a straight line for large ￿rm sizes. The right tail of the distribution is too thin. Research
and development generates new goods in Kortum and Klette (2004) according to Poisson
2It would be interesting to see the evolution of the cross-sectional variance over time. Also, given
the large data set, the ￿t of the log-normal distribution could be examined in more detail by plotting
the log of the number of cities in the right tail of the empirical distibution against the squared log of
city size.
5processes, whereas here productivity and taste shocks follow Brownian motions. In part,
the diﬀerent properties of these stochastic processes are at the origin of the diﬀerent size
distributions generated by the two economies.
Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2004) describe an economy with many sectors and many
￿rms in each sector. Firms operate decreasing return to scale Cobb-Douglas technologies
with factor shares that can vary across sectors. Capital is sector speci￿c, and the number
and size of ￿rms in a particular sector at a point in time is determined by a free-entry
condition.3 Mean reversion in sectoral technology shocks is used to generate a stationary
equilibrium. As in the current paper, Zipf￿s law only holds as a limiting case. In
Rossi-Hansberg (2004), however, moving away from this limit generates concavity in the
relation between log ￿rm size and log tail probabilities, at both ends of the distribution.
This seems to be at odds with Figure 1.
The analytical techniques used in this paper are standard. Useful references are Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) for stopping problems and Karlin and Taylor (1981) and Harrison
(1985) for hitting times and stationary distributions of Markov diﬀusions.
Outline of the Paper Section 2 describes the economy and determines the choices
made by individual consumers and ￿rms along a balanced growth path. Section 3 derives
the stationary distribution of ￿rm characteristics. This section also contains a discussion
of the size distribution of ￿rms and of the precise ways in which selection aﬀects the
distribution of ￿rm characteristics. The balanced growth path is determined in Section
4a n dt h ee ﬀects of market size and entry and ￿xed costs are discussed. Section 5
oﬀers two interpretations of the assumption that incumbents cannot grow as fast as
new entrants. Section 6 contains concluding remarks and discusses ongoing and possible
future research.
2. An Economy with Heterogeneous Firm Technologies
The economy has a ￿nal goods sector and a sector in which capital is accumulated. Final
goods are produced with capital and labor using ￿rm-speci￿c constant returns to scale
technologies. These ￿nal goods are perishable and can be used for consumption only.
3This feature somewhat complicates comparing their model with data. All ￿rms in an industry are
identical. Also, it does not matter which of the in￿nitesimal ￿rms in an industry exit when exit from
a particular industry is required. As a result, the model has no determinate implications for the joint
age-size distribution of ￿rms.
6Capital is produced using capital and labor, subject to constant returns to scale.
2.1 Consumers
Time is continuous and indexed by t ∈ [0,∞). There is a continuum Heηt of identical
in￿nitely-lived consumers alive at time t. The population growth rate η is taken to be
non-negative. Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor at every point in time.
Labor supply is inelastic. A typical consumer i has preferences over sequences {Ci,t}t≥0











for some positive α. A continuum of goods of diﬀerent types make up the composite
good. Preferences are additively separable with weights that de￿ne the type of a good.
The additive separability implies that all goods of the same type and trading at the same
p r i c ew i l lb ec o n s u m e da tt h es a m er a t e .L e tci,t[u,p] be consumer i￿s consumption at
time t of a good of type u that trades at a price p. In equilibrium, there will be a measure
Gt of goods that are available at time t,d e ￿n e do nt h es e to ft y p e sa n dp r i c e s . T h e
composite good is a version of the one speci￿ed in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Speci￿cally,












The type u of a good can be viewed as measure of quality. Consumer i chooses ci,t[u,p]













7The price elasticity of demand is −1/(1−ω), and the implied expenditure share for good
(u,p) is u(p/Pt)−ω/(1−ω).
Consumers own ￿rms and physical capital, and they can trade in a sequence of com-
plete markets, subject to a present-value borrowing constraint. Since preferences are
homothetic and markets are complete, we can assume there is a representative con-
sumer with the same preferences as described here for individual consumers. Aggregate
consumption of the composite good will be denoted by Ct and aggregate consumption
of a type-(u,p) commodity is c[u,p].
2.2 Capital Accumulation and Balanced Growth
There is a single physical capital good, the stock of which at time t is denoted by Kt.
Capital can be used to produce the diﬀerentiated ￿nal goods, and to reproduce capi-
tal. New capital and depreciated capital are perfect substitutes in production. Capital
depreciates at a rate δ. The technology for augmenting the capital stock is:
dKt =[ F(KI,t,ΛtLI,t) − δKt]dt (2)
dΛt = λΛtdt (3)
where KI,t is the amount of capital and LI,t is the amount of labor used in investment.
The production function F is strictly increasing, concave, and exhibits constant returns.
It is assumed to be suﬃciently smooth. The process Λt represents labor-augmenting
technological progress. This form of technological progress is taken to be exogenous
in this paper. Observe that the accumulation of physical and ￿human capital￿ Λt in
(2)-(3) is linear in (Kt,Λt) when KI,t/Kt and LI,t are constant. It is possible to make
labor-augmenting technological progress endogenous in a way that is consistent with
balanced growth, by letting consumers divide their time between supplying labor and
accumulating human capital, along the lines of Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991).
The price of capital in terms of the composite commodity is denoted by qt. Capital
can be rented by the producers of new capital and by the various ￿nal goods producers.
The rental price is vt and labor trades at a wage wt.B o t ha r ee x p r e s s e di nu n i t so ft h e
composite commodity per unit of time. Investors in capital goods maximize pro￿ts:
max
K,L
qtF(K,ΛtL) − vtK − wtL
Since F exhibits constant returns, these pro￿ts will be zero and factor prices and the





















On a balanced growth path, the fraction of the aggregate labor supply assigned to
investment is constant. The aggregate labor supply grows at a rate η,a n ds oLI,t = LIeηt
for some LI. Balanced growth requires a constant ratio of capital over eﬀective labor
used in investment. Therefore KI,t = KIe(λ+η)t for some KI. It follows from (4)-(5) that
the rental price of capital will grow at the same rate as the price of capital, and that
wages will grow at the rate at which the price of capital grows, plus the growth rate of
labor-augmenting technical progress.
The price of capital in terms of the composite ￿nal good depends on its marginal
product in the ￿nal goods producing sector. This marginal product will turn out to grow
at a rate κ that is determined in the next section. As a result, qt = qeκt, vt = veκt and
wt = we(κ+λ)t. On the balanced growth path, per capita consumption of the composite
commodity will grow at a rate κ + λ. The real interest rate in units of the composite
commodity is therefore:
r = ρ + α(κ + λ) (6)
The payoﬀs to owning capital consist of increases in its relative price minus physical
depreciation, plus the revenues from renting out capital. Since there is no aggregate




= r + δ − κ (7)
Equations (6) and (7) determine r and v/q in terms of exogenous parameters. Together
with (4) this determines the ratio ΛLI/KI, and (5) then determines w/q.
The total capital stock is given by Kt = Ke(λ+η)t along the balanced growth path.
The evolution of the capital stock described in (2) therefore implies that:
F (KI,ΛLI)=( λ + η + δ)K (8)
along the balanced growth path. This pins down the ratio KI/K of capital used in
the investment sector over the total capital stock. The following assumption ensures
that the technology for reproducing capital is suﬃciently productive to make balanced
growth possible.
Assumption 1: Preference parameters and growth rates satisfy:
ρ + α(κ + λ) > κ + λ
9The production function for capital accumulation is such that:
DKF(k,1) = ρ + α(κ + λ)+δ − κ
implies:
F(k,1) > (λ + η + δ)k
The ￿rst part of this assumption is needed to ensure that the labor income of consumers
is ￿nite. The second part implies that F(1,ΛLI/KI)/(λ + η + δ) is greater than one
when evaluated at the solution to (4) and (6)-(7). This then guarantees that the amount
of capital required to make the capital stock grow at the required rate is less than the
aggregate amount of capital available.
2.3 Final Goods Production
At y p i c a l￿rm can produce a unique ￿nal good using capital, variable labor, and a certain
amount of overhead labor. The ￿rm shuts down permanently if the required overhead
labor is not employed. A ￿rm may also be shut down as a result of exogenous shocks
that occur with a probability † per unit of time. This exogenous exit probability may
be zero, but allowing for it to be positive is important empirically to account for exit
that is not perfectly related to pro￿tability.
At age a,a￿rm that entered at time t with ￿xed characteristics x uses capital Kt,a
and production labor Lt,a to produce a quantity yt,a of the ￿nal good of type ut,a given
by:
yt,a = zt,aG[x](Kt,a,Λt,aLt,a) (9)
The overhead labor requirement of the ￿rm is denoted by M[x].4 Given a price pt,a,
revenues of the ￿rm are given by Rt,a = pt,ayt,a/Pt in units of the composite commodity.

















4An easy extension is to introduce decreasing returns by raising G[x](Kt,a,Λt,aLt,a) to a power
between 0 and 1. This will generate a version of the managerial span-of-control model of Lucas (1978).
The main eﬀect is to replace ω by a fraction of ω.
10A ￿rm￿s revenues vary with changes in the type ut,a of its output and its productivity
level zt,a.N o t et h a tZt,a = zt,a if ut,a is constant and normalized to 1.I nm u c ho fw h a t
follows, this paper ignores prices and quantities of the individual ￿nal goods, and focuses
on the properties of equilibrium revenues and factor inputs. For this, it is not necessary
to disentangle preference and technology shocks. With some abuse of terminology, Zt,a
will be referred to as ￿rm total factor productivity or simply ￿rm productivity.








The vector x of ￿xed characteristics is drawn from an exogenously given time-invariant

















where Wt,a is a standard Brownian motion. The standard deviation σ∗ is taken to
be positive. A ￿nal goods producer enters with an idiosyncratic level of labor input
requirements that depend on its vintage. After entry, the eﬃciency units of labor in
any given ￿nal goods ￿rm continue to grow at the same rate as they do in any other
￿nal goods ￿rm, and in the investment sector. Instead, the combined preference and
technology state variable evolves according to a geometric random walk, with a drift ζ∗
that will be required to be not too large relative to ζ. The Brownian motions Wt,a are
assumed to be independent across ￿rms.5
Measured in units of the composite good, the value Vt[x] of a ￿rm entering at time t
with ￿xed characteristics x is given by:






−(r+†)a (Rt,a − vt+aKt,a − wt+a (Lt,a + M[x]))da
‚
(11)
The maximization is subject to (10) and the restriction that choice variables only depend
on the available information.
The aggregate labor supply is growing at a rate η, and every ￿rm requires a minimum
￿xed amount of labor to operate. The number of ￿rms can therefore not grow exponen-
tially at any rate above η. Along the balanced growth path, the number of ￿rms will
grow exactly at the rate η,s ot h a tNt = Neηt for some N.O b s e r v et h a t￿rm revenues
5Much of what follows can be generalized by allowing ζ∗ and σ∗ to be functions of the underlying
￿xed characteristics x. This may be an empirically important generalization.




t,a.G r o w t hi nt h en u m b e ro f￿rms acts like an improvement in productivity. In
the equilibrium constructed below, aggregate productivity in the ￿nal goods sector itself





[ωζ +( 1− ω)η] (12)
along the balanced growth path. This growth rate exceeds ζ if utility is increasing in the
number of goods and the population growth rate is positive. Aggregate consumption at
time t will be Ct = Ce(κ+λ+η)t along the balanced growth path.
2.3.1 Variable Input Choices
Capital and variable labor inputs are chosen to maximize variable revenues at a point in
time. For a ￿rm with ￿xed characteristics x, the resulting ratio of capital over eﬀective











This is a direct consequence of the fact that the rate of labor-augmenting technological
progress of the ￿rm is equal to the growth rate λ of the ratio of rental prices wt/vt.
The ratio wt/vt is already determined by balanced growth considerations in the capital
accumulation sector, and so (13) pins down the capital-labor ratios for all ￿rms. The





















Note that the ratios of factor payments over revenues are constant. Variable pro￿ts
are a fraction 1 − ω of revenues. Using the link (12) between productivity growth, the
growth rate of the number of ￿rms, and the growth rate of wages, one can simplify the
















12Aggregate consumption per ￿rm grows at the same rate as wages. The evolution over
time of ￿rm revenues and factor payments relative to wages is therefore determined by
the variable e−ζaZt,a/Zt,0. This is the key variable determining the dynamics of ￿rm size.
Observe that it only depends on a and not on t. The cross-sectional distribution of this
variable will be constant along the balanced growth path. As a result, the population
average of ￿rm revenues Rt,a will have the same trend as aggregate consumption per
￿rm.
To determine the value of a ￿rm, it will be convenient to write ￿rm pro￿ts as:
Rt,a − (vt+aKt,a + wt+aLt,a + wt+aM[x]) = wt+aM[x](e
sa − 1)

























The variable sa measures pro￿tability, and the initial pro￿tability of a new ￿rm with
￿xed characteristics x is measured by S[x].I fsa =0 , then variable revenues just cover
overhead, and ￿ow pro￿ts are zero. De￿ne the value function V (•) as:







sa − 1)da s0 = s
‚
for any s. The evolution of the pro￿tability of a ￿r ms e tu pa tt i m et is described by













The pro￿tability of a ￿rm, as measured by sa, has a negative drift when productivity
inside the ￿rm is expected to grow more slowly than the productivity of new entrants.
Note that the diﬀerences in these growth rates and the variance of productivity shocks
are magni￿ed signi￿cantly when the diﬀerentiated goods are close substitutes. The value
of a ￿rm entering at time t with ￿xed characteristics x can now be written as:
Vt[x]=wtM[x]V (S[x])
V (s) is the value of a ￿rm relative to its overhead expenses when the current state of
pro￿tability is s. The value function V (•) only depends on the interest rate and ￿xed
parameters of the economy.
132.3.2 Exit Decisions
T h ep r e s e n c eo fa￿xed cost implies a minimum size. Firms with very low productivity
will choose to exit. The value of a ￿rm must be ￿nite in any equilibrium. The following
a s s u m p t i o nm a k e ss u r et h a tt h i si st h ec a s e .
Assumption 2: The productivity and exogenous exit parameters satisfy:





where κ is given by (12) and ￿ and σ are de￿n e di nt e r m so fζ, ζ∗ and σ∗ by (18).
Assumption 1 and the fact that † is non-negative already imply that ρ+α(κ+λ)+†>
κ + λ, which ensures that the ￿xed costs incurred by the ￿rm have a ￿nite present
value even if the ￿rm is never shut down for other than exogenous reasons. Assumption
2 implies that the present value of pro￿ts before ￿xed costs is also ￿nite for such a
shut-down policy.
The value function V (s) must satisfy the following Bellman equation in the range of
s where a ￿rm is not shut down:
rV(s)=( κ + λ − †)V (s)+AV (s)+e








T h er e t u r nt oo w n i n ga￿rm consists of a capital gain (κ+λ−†)V (s)+AV (s)/V (s) and
a dividend yield (es − 1)/V (s). It is optimal to shut down a ￿rm when its pro￿tability
s falls below some threshold b. Given that the ￿rm is shut down at b,i tm u s tb e
that the value of a ￿rm is zero at that point. This implies the boundary condition
V (b)=0 . The optimal threshold must be such that V is diﬀerentiable at b,a n ds o
DV (b)=0 . A further boundary condition follows from the fact that the value function
cannot exceed the value of a ￿rm that operates without ￿x e dc o s t s .T h i si m p l i e st h a t
V (s) ≤ es/(r + † − [κ + λ + ￿ + σ2/2]).
With these boundary conditions, the Bellman equation (19) has only one solution.
For σ > 0, the solution is by V (s)=0for s ≤ b,a n db y :
V (s)=
1
























￿2 +2 σ2 (r + † − [κ + λ])
i
14and the exit barrier b satis￿es:
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r + † − [κ + λ]
(21)
The ￿rst two terms in (20) represent the present value of {esa − 1}a≥0 given s0 = s.
The third term represents the added value that comes from the possibility of shutting
down the ￿rm when variable revenues are low. Note that r + † − [κ + λ] implies ξ > 0.
The third term in (20) therefore converges to zero as sa gets large. It follows that
V (s) is strictly increasing on (b,∞), with an asymptote equal to the present value of
{esa − 1}a≥0.T h e f a c t t h a t ξ is positive also implies that the factor multiplying the
present value (r + †− [κ + λ])−1 in (21) is positive and smaller than one. The left-hand
side of (21) is the present value of {esa}a≥0 conditional on s0 = b. Thus production will
be stopped when sa reaches the point where the present value of continuing production
forever falls below −(r + † − [κ + λ])−1(1 + ξ)−1.
The construction of V (s) in (20)-(21) holds for σ > 0.T h e c a s e o f σ =0can be
computed directly or by taking limits in the above expressions.
2.3.3 Entry Decisions
Setting up a ￿rm requires a blueprint. A blueprint with ￿xed characteristic x is de-
￿ned by the production function G[x](•) and the ￿xed cost and productivity parameters
(M[x],Z[x]). New blueprints can be obtained by drawing a characteristic x from a dis-
tribution with density g(x). The rate at which such draws can be obtained is equal to
1/Γ times the amount of labor assigned to the development of blueprints. Blueprints
can only be used at the time they are developed. Along the balanced growth path to
be constructed, the number of ￿rms grows at the same rate as the population and ￿rms
exit at a constant rate. Thus new ￿rms must be set up at a constant rate as well. A pos-
itive amount of labor must therefore be assigned to the development of new blueprints.





This zero-pro￿t condition depends implicitly on the interest rate r,v i aV (•),a n do n
steady-state rental prices and aggregate consumption, via S[•]. The following assumption
is used to make sure that the expected value of entry is ￿nite.






The expected ￿xed cost and productivity of a potential entrant cannot be too high. The
fact that this suﬃces to ensure that the right-hand side of (22) is ￿nite follows from (17)
and (20).
If Assumption 3 holds, then the zero-pro￿t condition (22) implies a unique equilib-
rium value for C/w1/(1−ω). In turn this pins down the equilibrium value of the function
S[•]. To see this, recall from (17) that eS[x]−b is equal to the product of C/w1/(1−ω) and
a function that only depends on ￿xed characteristics x and the capital-labor ratios k[x].
These capital-labor ratios only depend on ￿xed characteristics and the ratio of rental
prices v/w. This ratio was determined by the balanced growth requirements (4)-(6). It
then follows from (20) that (22) uniquely determines the equilibrium value of C/w1/(1−ω).
It is not diﬃcult to see that this ratio, and thus eS[x]−b for all x,i si n c r e a s i n gi nΓ.I n
equilibrium, the more diﬃcult it is to enter, the higher must be the initial pro￿tability
of all entering ￿rms.
3. The Stationary Distribution of Firm Characteristics
Every ￿nal goods ￿rm needs some amount of overhead labor to produce, and the ag-
gregate labor supply grows at a non-negative rate η. Along the balance growth path
to be constructed below, the number of ￿rms also grows at the rate η. The following
assumption will be imposed to guarantee a stationary distribution of ￿rm characteristics
with a mean pro￿tability that is ￿nite.
Assumption 4: The productivity parameters satisfy:





where ￿ and σ are de￿n e di n( 1 8 ) .
Note that ￿ + σ2/2 is the drift of the pro￿tability measure esa.T h u s A s s u m p t i o n 4
requires that the pro￿tability of a typical incumbent ￿rm is not expected to grow faster
than the sum of the population growth rate and the exogenous exit rate. The growth
16rate of pro￿tability among surviving ￿rms will be greater than ￿+σ2/2.I f†+η is zero
then ￿ must be negative, but it can be positive otherwise. Section 5 oﬀers two examples
of environments in which ￿ is negative.
3.1 Fixed Characteristics, Age, and Proﬁtability
The state of a ￿rm is de￿ned by its ￿xed characteristics x and the state variable s.
Although the age of the ￿rm is irrelevant for its operations, knowing the joint distribution
of age and other ￿rm characteristics is useful when comparing the model with data.6
The following therefore describes the joint distribution of age a and characteristics (x,s).
Along the balanced growth path, there will be a measure of ￿rms growing at a rate
η, and de￿ned on the set of possible ages, ￿xed characteristics, and pro￿tability levels.
T h ed e n s i t yo ft h i sm e a s u r ea td a t et can be written as Neηtp(a,x,s),w h e r ep is a
probability density. This density must satisfy the following version of the Kolmogorov
forward equation:





for all a>0 and s>b .T h e ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (23) re￿ects the
exogenous exit of ￿rms and the fact that the measure of ￿rms grows over time. The
remaining two terms describe how the density p(a,x,s) evolves as a result of changes in
the pro￿tability of individual ￿rms.
The boundary value p(0,x,s) is determined by the rate at which new ￿rms enter.
Let Eeηt be the number of blueprints developed at time t per unit of time. That is, Eeηt
represents the number of draws obtained from the density g per unit of time. Of these




g(x)E/N s = S[x] >b
0 otherwise
(24)
A further boundary condition is given by the requirement that p(a,x,b)=0for all
a>0. This condition arises from the fact that ￿rms exit at b while none enter starting
from pro￿tability levels below b. To ensure that p i sap r o p e rd e n s i t y ,i tm u s ta l s ob e
the case that p(a,x,s) goes to zero for large (a,x,s).
6For example, the U.S. Census of Manufactures is taken once every ￿ve years, generating ￿ve-year age
cohorts. The stationary distribution of age and ￿rm characteristics can be used to infer the composition
of such cohorts and this can then be used to compute subsequent cohort growth and exit rates implied by
the model. See Luttmer (2004). The fact that the distribution is known analytically greatly fascilitates
these computations.
17The partial diﬀerential equation (23)-(24) can be viewed as a collection of indepen-
dent partial diﬀerential equations in (a,s),o n ef o re a c hx. This is a consequence of the
assumption that x is constant over time, and the result that exit decisions only depend
on the pro￿tability level s. The solution of (23)-(24) is given by:
p(a,x,s)=e
−(†+η)aψ(a,s|S[x])g(x)E/N (25)
























By diﬀerentiating, one can check that the two terms that de￿ne e−(†+η)aψ(a,s|s0) both
satisfy (23). For small values of a,t h e￿rst term approximates a normal probability
density that puts almost all probability close to s = s0. The second term converges to
zero as a goes to zero, since s + s0 > 2b.A s a r e s u l t ,p(a,x,s) converges to the value
required by the boundary condition (24), as a goes to zero. The fact that ψ(a,s|b)=0
ensures that the boundary condition p(a,x,b)=0holds.
3.2 Proﬁtability Conditional on Fixed Characteristics–The Power Law
To complete the description of the equilibrium and to analyze the properties of the size
distribution of ￿rms, it will be convenient to have expressions for the density of age and
pro￿tability, as well as pro￿tability, conditional on ￿xed characteristics.















￿2 +2 σ2[† + η]
·
Assumption 4 implies that θ > 1 and the fact that † + η is non-negative implies that
θ∗ is non-negative as well. If † + η =0 ,t h e nθ is simply equal to −2￿/σ2 and θ∗ =0 .
By integrating e−(†+η)aψ(a,s|s0) one can verify that the density of age and pro￿tability








7The standard normal density and distribution functions are denoted by φ and Φ, respectively.













for all s ≥ b. An example is shown in Figure 2. The kink in this density at s = s0
is a result of the entry that takes place at s0. Conditional on s ≥ s0, the density of
es implied by (27) is a Pareto density with tail probabilities of the form e−θs.T h i s i s
the power law found in ￿rm size data. The parameter θ will be referred to as the ￿tail
index￿ of the pro￿tability distribution. In the case of Axtell (2001) and Figure 1 above,
θ is just greater than 1, as required by Assumption 4.











s b  S[x] 
π (s|S[x]) 
Figure 2: Density of Size Conditional on Fixed Characteristics
T h es i z eo fa￿rm measured by revenues or variable labor inputs is proportional to a
factor depending on ￿xed characteristics, and pro￿tability. The model described here can
therefore account for a power law in ￿rm size data if pro￿tability is the main determinant
of size. Unlike the Pareto density, and like the log-normal density often considered as
an alternative, the density (27) is upward sloping for low size levels. Unlike the log-
normal, the support of (27) is bounded below, as a result of the ￿xed costs that cause
low-productivity ￿rms to exit.
8Alternatively, note that by integrating out a from (23)-(24) one obtains an inhomogeneous second-
order diﬀerential equation in s with a characteristic equation †+η+￿z−σ2z2/2=0 . The roots of this
equation are θ and θ∗. The diﬀerential equation is solved by (27).















Given that † + η is non-negative, Assumption 4 is exactly equivalent to θ > 1.T h u sa n
approximate version of Zipf￿s law can hold in this economy, but it cannot hold exactly.
The stationary density (27) would be well de￿ned even for θ > 0, but without θ > 1 the
mean of es−b would not be ￿nite and aggregate quantities would not be well de￿ned. The
average pro￿tability in a large cross-section of ￿rms would not converge as the number
of ￿rms grows without bound. The abstraction of an economy with balanced growth
and a continuum of in￿nitesimal ￿r m si sn o tw e l ld e ￿n e di nt h a tc a s e . 91 0
The right-hand side of (28) is greater than θ/(θ−1). Thus the ratio of the pro￿tability
of the average ￿rm relative to an exiting ￿rm is bounded below by θ/(θ −1).W h e nt h e
productivity growth rate of existing ￿r m si sc l o s et ot h a to fn e we n t r a n t s ,θ will be close
to 1 and the lower bound θ/(θ−1) w i l lb eav e r yl a r g en u m b e r .I ns u c ha ne n v i r o n m e n t ,
even the average ￿rm is much larger and more pro￿table than the ￿rms that exit. If
entry is easy, then S[x] − b will be small for most x. In that case, entering ￿rms will
also be small relative to the average ￿rm, and the power law will apply over much of the
range of ￿rm sizes.
3.3 The Rate of Entry
The solution p to (23)-(24) given in (25) is a probability density only for a particular
value of E/N. This can be used to determine the amount of entry that must take place
relative to the number of existing ￿rms. Since π is a probability density, it follows from













9Gabaix (2003) has proposed to move away from this abstraction and to consider an economy with
large ￿rms to generate aggregate shocks.
10Suppose the exogenous exit and population growth rates are zero. Consider the limiting distribution
obtained by letting s0 go to b. This turns the pro￿tability process of a dynasty of ￿rms into a Brownian
motion with a negative drift and a re￿ecting barrier at b. The resulting distribution for es is a Pareto
distribution on es ≥ eb with mean ebθ/(θ − 1). In Gabaix (1999), es is the size of a city relative to the
average city size. This must have mean 1, and so θ = 1/(1 − eb). The explanation given in Gabaix
(1999) for Zipf￿s law for relative city sizes is that b must be very small.
20This expression simpli￿es when there is no exogenous exit or population growth. Note
that [1 − e−θ∗(s−b)]/(† + η) converges to −(S[x] − b)/￿ as † + η goes to zero. This
is the average life span of a ￿rm with ￿xed characteristics x that only exits when its
pro￿tability reaches b.T h ee n t r yr a t eE/N therefore converges to the reciprocal of the
average life span −￿−1 R
S[x]>b(S[x] − b)g(x)dx among entering ￿rms as the exogenous
exit and population growth rates go to zero. Absent initial heterogeneity the amount of
entry per unit of time is simply the reciprocal of the expected life span of an entering
￿rm, as might be expected.
The assumed linear technology for generating entry attempts implies that the amount
of labor used for entry at time t is LEeηt,w h e r eLE/N = ΓE/N. The equilibrium value
of this ratio is therefore determined by the entry rate (29). A decrease in the entry cost
Γ implies more entry attempts per unit of labor and lowers eS[x]−b by a factor that is
common to all x, by the zero pro￿t condition. It follows from (29) that the entry rate
E/N is decreasing in the entry cost Γ.
3.4 Firm Characteristics and Selection on Proﬁtability
The stationary population of ￿rm characteristics is generated by a distribution of char-
acteristics among potential entrants, together with a process of pre- and post-entry


















for all s ≥ b and S[x] ≥ b. The second factor in this expression is the marginal p(x) of
the stationary density. Selection determines how this marginal diﬀers from the density
of ￿xed characteristics among potential entrants, and from the density of ￿xed charac-
teristics among actual entrants. Only ￿rms with a suﬃciently high initial pro￿tability
will enter, and the entering ￿rms with an initial pro￿tability S[x] close to the exit barrier
b are more likely to exit over time. As a result, g(x) is truncated at S[x]=b and down-
weighted for small S[x]−b. As expected, this last eﬀect is strongest when †+η is small.
The resulting density is then approximately proportional to (S[x]−b)g(x).O nt h eo t h e r
hand, if the random exit rate or the population growth rate are large, then e−θ∗(S[x]−b)
is small and the stationary density of ￿xed characteristics is determined essentially by
pre-entry selection. Post-entry selection will be strong also if Γ is suﬃciently small so
that entry is very easy. This implies that S[x] − b is small for all x, and the resulting
stationary density is then again approximately proportional to (S[x] − b)g(x).
21The initial pro￿tability S[x] depends on the technology G[x](•) and the overhead and
productivity parameters M[x] and Z[x]. Other things equal, the process of selection
makes ￿rms with low ￿xed costs M[x], high initial productivity Z[x], and high marginal
products of labor DLG[x](k[x],1) more prevalent in the overall population than among
entrants or potential entrants.
To emphasize the importance of random productivity growth in shaping the distrib-
ution of ￿rm characteristics, it is instructive to consider what happens as the variance
of productivity shocks, σ2, goes to zero. For simplicity, suppose that † + η =0 .A s -
sumption 4 then requires ￿<0 and at σ2 =0one obtains ξ =( r + †−[κ+λ])/|￿| and
b =0 . Firms exit immediately when they no longer break even since there is no option
value to continuing operations. An entering ￿rm starts with pro￿tability s0,a n dt h i s
pro￿tability will then decline linearly to 0,a tw h i c hp o i n tt h e￿rm exits. As σ2 goes to
0, the tail-index θ grows without bound. Using (27) one can verify that the stationary
pro￿tability distribution π(•|S[x]) converges to a uniform distribution on (0,S[x]).I n
this limiting economy, the largest and most pro￿table ￿rm conditional on ￿xed charac-
teristics is the most recent entrant. This is in sharp contrast to what is found in the
data. The randomness in productivity growth generates a selection mechanism by which
the typical ￿rm can be much larger and productive than recent entrants.
4. The Balanced Growth Path
4.1 Market Clearing
The decision rules (13)-(17) imply that the revenues of a ￿rm with ￿xed characteristic x
in state s at time t are given by wtM[x]es/(1 − ω). Aggregate output of the composite
consumption good is determined by aggregating these revenues using the stationary
density of ￿rm characteristics. Physical capital and variable labor inputs for a ￿rm of
type (x,s) are also implied by (13)-(17). Recall that per-capita consumption grows at
ar a t eκ + λ along the balanced growth path. Per capita variable labor inputs must be
constant. Let LCeηt, KCe(λ+η)t and YCe(κ+λ+η)t be aggregate variable labor, capital, and
aggregate output in the ￿nal goods sector. Since wt = we(κ+λ)t and vt = veκt,l a b o r
and capital shares are constant and equal to wLC/YC and vKC/YC, respectively. Labor
productivity grows at a rate κ + λ in the ￿nal goods sector. The levels of the balanced






































Recall that the ratio of rental prices v/w and the ratios LI/KI and KI/K are determined
by balanced growth considerations in the capital accumulation sector. This determines
k[x] for all ￿rm types, and together with the zero-pro￿t condition this then determines
the function S[•]. The equilibrium ￿rm averages [YC/w,KC,L C,L M]/N are therefore
implied by (31) and (32).
The balanced growth path is now determined by imposing market clearing conditions.





























respectively. The ratio KI/N follows immediately from (33) and the value of KC/N
implied by (31). The labor market clearing condition (34) can then be used to solve for
the number of ￿rms N, using the allocation of labor [LE,L M,L C]/N implied by (29)
and (31)-(32).
When measured in units of labor, average ￿rm output YC/(wN) follows from (31).
Together with the market clearing condition YC = C and the de￿nition of S[•],t h i sc a n
















The equilibrium rental price of capital follows from this and the ratio v/w.T h i se s t a b -
lishes the following proposition.
Proposition 1: If Assumptions 1-4 hold, then there exists a balanced growth path.
234.2 Market Size, Fixed and Entry Costs, and Per Capita Consumption
The economy described here has implications for the eﬀects of market size and of ￿xed
and entry costs that are exactly the same as those obtained in a static economy of this
type, such as Krugman (1979).
Measure market size by population, and consider variation in H.R e c a l lt h a tk[•] and
S[•] are determined by balanced growth and zero-pro￿t conditions that do not depend on
H. The right-hand side of (31) does not, therefore, vary with H, and (34) then implies
that the number of ￿rms and ￿nal goods must be proportional to H. It follows from
(35) that the elasticity of w and v with respect to the size of the population is (1−ω)/ω,
as in (12). This is also the elasticity of per-capita consumption with respect to H,
since YC/H =( YC/N)(N/H) varies in direct proportion to the wage. The aggregate
value of physical capital in the economy is vtKt/r, and the aggregate value of ￿rms not
including physical capital, or ￿intangible capital,￿ is equal to Ntwt times the average of
M[x]V (s) in the population. Changes in H do not aﬀect the ratios of these aggregates
over aggregate consumption.
The eﬀects of entry and ￿xed costs are easiest to examine by considering what hap-
pens when the entry costs Γ and ￿xed costs M[•] a r es c a l e dd o w nb yac o m m o nf a c t o r .
The zero-pro￿t condition only depends on the ratio M[•]/Γ,a n ds op r o ￿tability at entry
S[x]−b is not aﬀected. It follows from (29), (31)-(32) and (33) that [LE,L M,L C,L I]/N
d e c l i n e sb yt h es a m ef a c t o ra s(Γ,M[•]). The labor market clearing condition then im-
plies that the number of ￿rms must rise by the same factor. A reduction in entry and
￿xed costs has exactly the same eﬀect on the number of ￿r m sa sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
population. The elasticity of wages with respect to ￿xed and entry costs is therefore
−(1 − ω)/ω. The resulting elasticity of per capita consumption is also −(1 − ω)/ω,
since the increase in N and the reduction in M[•] exactly cancel each other in (31). The
aggregate allocation of labor and, in particular, the aggregate expenditure on entry and
￿xed costs measured in units of labor do not change when entry and ￿xed costs per ￿rm
decline. As expected, the eﬀect on ￿nal goods consumption can be large if goods are
very imperfect substitutes.
4.3 Entry Costs and Per Capita Consumption
The eﬀects of varying the entry cost Γ only while keeping the ￿xed costs M[•] constant
are more complicated than those of a parallel shift in (Γ,M[•]).A ni n c r e a s ei nΓ implies
that C/w1/(1−ω) and the function eS[x]−b are scaled up. Entrants must earn higher
pro￿ts to warrant the higher expense of entry. The shift in eS[x]−b will in general aﬀect
24the distribution of characteristics among entrants, and this complicates tracing out the
eﬀects of an increase in Γ. If there is no heterogeneity in ￿xed characteristics, then the
entry rate E/N will unambiguously go down. New entrants will enter farther away from
the exit boundary, and this implies that average life spans will be longer. As a result, it
takes less entry to maintain a given population of ￿rms. Per ￿rm, the amount of labor
required for entry is LE/N = Γ(E/N).U s i n g t h e z e r o p r o ￿t condition (22) and the
equation (29) for E/N,o n ec a nv e r i f yt h a tLE/N increases with an increase in Γ.T h e
reduction in the entry rate E/N does not oﬀ-set the increase in Γ.S i n c e eS[x]−b rises,
￿rms will on average be larger, and one can use (31) and (32) to show that labor and
capital inputs per ￿rm will rise. Together with (33)-(34) this implies that the number
of ￿rms will decline. Note from (35) that wages are an increasing function of N times
the population average of es−S[x]. T h i si st h er a t i oo fa v e r a g e￿rm pro￿tability over
the pro￿tability of entrants. An increase in S[x] causes this ratio to fall, by (28). It
follows that wages fall as a result of an increase in entry costs. Aggregate consumption is
equal to the population average of M[x]es times wN. Although the population average
of M[x]es increases with an increase in Γ,b o t ha n dw and N decline. It is possible
to construct examples in which aggregate consumption is an increasing function of the
entry cost over some range.11
4.4 The Limiting Case of Zipf’s Law
Absent any heterogeneity in ￿xed characteristics, Zipf￿s law corresponds to θ =1 .T h i s
case is ruled out in Assumption 4. But the balanced growth path is well de￿ned for any
θ greater than 1. To examine the nature of the balanced growth path for economies for
which Zipf￿s law is a very good approximation, consider what happens if θ approaches 1
from above as ζ∗ increases to the boundary of the region de￿ned by Assumption 4. The
parameter ζ∗ does not aﬀect the balanced growth rates or the interest rate. The zero-
pro￿t condition and the resulting scale of eS[x]−b vary continuously with θ,a n da r ew e l l
de￿ned at θ =1 .T h ee n t r yr a t er e l a t i v et ot h en u m b e ro f￿rms de￿ned in (29) converges
to a ￿nite and positive number. The same is true for the ￿x e dc o s t sg i v e ni n( 3 2 ) .T h u s
LE/N and LM/N will converge to ￿nite and positive limits. But, as can be seen from
(28) and (31), the level of output per ￿rm measured in units of labor grows without
11Lagos (2001) has emphasized selection eﬀects in determining the relation between the magnitude
of search frictions and the level of aggregate productivity. The mechanism here is similar and the
economy described here might be useful to further examine the eﬀects of allocation frictions on aggregate
productivity.
25bound, and so do the required capital and labor inputs. It follows from the capital and
labor market clearing conditions (33)-(34) that the number of ￿rms must converge to
zero. An immediate implication is that LE +LM goes to zero. For θ close to one, almost
all labor is allocated as variable labor to operate a small set of large ￿rms, and almost no
labor is used to cover ￿xed and entry costs. It may be hard to obtain precise empirical
analogues to the ￿xed and entry costs as they are de￿ned in this economy. But it would
seem that the implication of Zipf￿s law that aggregate expenditures on ￿xed and entry
costs are essentially zero is too extreme.
If †+η is zero, then θ =1implies that ￿+σ2/2 is zero, and thus ￿<0 as long as σ2 > 0
and Assumption 4 is required to hold. That is, incumbent ￿rms must experience slower
productivity growth than potential entrants. If ￿rm productivity growth is deterministic,
t h e nt h eo p p o s i t ec a s eo f￿>0 can be analyzed separately. A balanced growth path for
such an economy has no entry and an initial population of ￿rms that stays in business
forever. Aggregate consumption and wages grow at a rate ζ∗ + λ instead of ζ + λ.T h e
resulting lack of entry and exit is at odds with the data.12 The properties of economies
in which Assumption 4 fails and in which productivity growth is stochastic remain to
be examined.
4.5 A Possibly Anomalous Implication
The price of capital in terms of consumption goods is given by qt = qeκt along the
balanced growth path. The parameter κ is de￿n e di n( 1 2 )a n dm e a s u r e st h eg r o w t h
rate of total factor productivity in the ￿nal goods sector. Many authors have argued
that the price of capital has declined in terms of consumption at a steady rate in post-
war U.S. data (see Gordon (1990) and Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell [1997]). One
possibility is to interpret this decline as an adjustment to the balanced growth path,
with the marginal product of capital falling over time as more and higher quality capital
is used in the production of consumption goods. But the adjustment would have to be
extremely slow. Using the economy described here, the decline in the price of capital
can be interpreted as a balanced growth phenomenon by taking ζ negative. This means
that total factor productivity in the ￿nal goods sector, accounting for both quantity and
quality changes, grows at a negative rate. This is probably not very plausible.
An alternative explanation is that the growth rate of the measured consumer price
12Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) report 5-year entry and exit rates for manufacturing ￿rms
on the order of .5. That is, roughly 10% of the population of manufacturing ￿rms exits every year and
is replaced by new ￿rms.
26index signi￿cantly over-estimates the growth rate of the actual cost of a constant-utility
bundle of goods. For recent discussions of this issue, see Gordon (2000) and Klenow
(2003). If an appropriately measured consumer price index grows more slowly than the
one commonly used, then the measured price of capital would not decline as much or even
rise in terms of consumption. The composite commodity described in this paper involves
a constantly changing set of goods with quality weights that are constantly changing as
well. Even complete data on quantities and prices of all ￿nal goods consumed in this
economy would not allow one to measure the composite commodity since the utility
weights are unobservable. Further identifying assumptions would be needed.
A related interpretation can be constructed by amending the model with a retail sec-
tor that converts labor and the diﬀerentiated output of ￿rms into consumption. Specif-
ically, take actual consumption to be C
%
t LR,t
1−% for some % ∈ (0,1). Ct is the composite
commodity used throughout the paper, and LR,t is labor used in the retail sector. Note
that there is no labor-augmenting technological progress in the retail sector. The Cobb-
Douglas assumption is necessary for balanced growth in this modi￿ed economy. The
composite commodity is appropriately interpreted as an intermediate good and con-
sumption is the output of the retail sector. Along the balanced growth path, LR,t is
constant and the price of consumption in terms of the intermediate good will rise at a
rate (1−%)(κ+λ). As a result, the price of capital in terms of consumption grows at a
rate %(κ+λ)−λ.T h i sw i l lb en e g a t i v ei fλ is a suﬃciently large part of the growth rate
κ + λ of intermediate output, and if the share of labor in the retail sector is suﬃciently
large.
The key to this interpretation is a slower rate of labor-augmenting technological
progress in the retail sector than in the up-stream sectors of the economy. This is also
the essence of the explanation oﬀered in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997). It
relies heavily on the Cobb-Douglas assumption to generate balanced growth.
5. Two Interpretations
The main assumption used to construct a stationary distribution of ￿rm size with a
￿nite mean is that ζ is suﬃciently large relative to ζ∗.I np a r t i c u l a r ,i f† = η =0 ,t h e n
θ > 1 means that ζ > ζ∗+ 1
2σ2
∗ω/(1−ω). The productivity growth rate for new entrants
must exceed that of incumbent ￿rms by an amount that can be large when diﬀerentiated
￿nal goods are close substitutes or when the variance σ2
∗ is large.
This section presents two possible interpretations of the assumption that ζ is suﬃ-
27ciently large relative to ζ∗. In one, the adaptation by existing producers to new and
improved inputs is imperfect, while new entrants are perfectly adapted. In the other,
some of the information generated as a result of learning-by-doing by incumbents can be
used by new entrants. If this information spillover is not too small, then ζ will exceed
ζ∗ by enough to generate a stationary distribution of ￿rm characteristics with a ￿nite
mean.
5.1 Limited Adaptation
Suppose that the ￿quality￿ of capital at time t is measured by Qt and let Kt/Qt denote
the constant-quality stock of capital at time t.I f Qt = Qeκt, then the technology for
accumulating constant-quality capital is the same as (2), with Λt replaced by Λt/Qt
and δ replaced by δ + κ. If capital inputs for ￿nal goods producing ￿rms are measured
in constant-quality units, then zt,a and Λt,a i n( 9 )m u s tb er e p l a c e db yzt,aQt+a and
Λt,a/Qt+a, respectively. The growth rates κ and λ change to κ+κ and λ−κ.O fc o u r s e ,
the growth rate of output is not aﬀected by the units in which capital is measured, but
the decomposition of this growth rate into total factor productivity growth and labor-
augmenting technical progress is. The technology (2) can be given a vintage capital
interpretation as in Solow (1960), by taking F(KI,t/Qt,(Λt/Qt)LI,t) to be the output of
capital of vintage t, with quality level Qt.
To describe limited adaptation by incumbent ￿rms, consider a ￿nal goods producer








t,a = Kt,a/Qt+a represents the quantity of constant-quality capital used by the
￿rm at time t+a. That is, constant-quality capital K∗
t,a and hours of labor Lt,a translate
into ￿rm-speci￿ce ﬃciency units determined by Qt,a and Λt,a, respectively. Suppose it
i st h ec a s et h a tQt,a/Qt+a = Λt,a/Λt+a. Then the modi￿ed technology (36) corresponds









If Qt,a/Qt+a = Λt,a/Λt+a < 1, then this provides an interpretation of the assumption that
￿rm productivity grows more slowly on average than aggregate productivity. Although
the quality of capital and labor inputs available to the ￿rm improves over time, the ￿rm
can only make use of these quality improvements to a certain extent. If there is no
28improvement in the way in which the ￿rm can make use of ￿rm-speci￿ce ﬃciency units,
then z∗
t,a does not depend on age a and the discrepancy ζ∗ − ζ measures precisely the
extent to which a typical ￿rm cannot take advantage of the quality improvements of its
inputs.
5.2 Learning-by-Doing with Spillovers
Firms generate improvements in their ￿rm-speci￿c total factor productivity at an average
rate ζ∗,a sl o n ga st h e yp a yt h e￿xed cost M. This can be interpreted as learning-by-
doing, and the rate at which learning takes place is taken as given. Firms do face an
extensive margin: by staying in business a ￿rm chooses to continue to improve the
technology available to the ￿rm. But what determines the rate at which the technology
of potential entrants improves? In the model described so far, potential entrants invest
in new products and techniques by sampling from a distribution, and this distribution
improves for reasons that are left unexplained.
One possibility is that every potential entrant has to start from scratch. In the
context of the economy described here, this can be interpreted to mean ζ =0 .I fζ∗ > 0,
this violates the conditions for a stationary distribution of ￿rms to emerge. But one
can guess what will happen: the average growth of incumbents and the selection that
arises from σ∗ > 0 will generate a population of incumbents that is farther and farther
removed from the technology that is available to potential entrants. As a result, the
value of trying to enter from scratch will become very small: the technology likely to be
obtained by an entrant will become more and more ineﬃcient relative to the technologies
of the surviving incumbents. Very little if any entry will occur. Attempting to enter
the car market in 2004 is not likely to be pro￿table for an entrant who ￿rst needs to
re-invent the wheel.
To generate a steady-state level of successful entry, some amount of copying by po-
tential entrants must be possible. This will be modeled here by assuming that potential
entrants can start with an initial technology that is related to the population of technolo-
gies already in use. This generates an externality that is well known to be a potential
source of growth (Lucas [1988]). In Eaton and Eckstein (1997), spillovers across cities
are the mechanism by which the distribution of human capital across cities is kept from
spreading out too fast.
For simplicity, heterogeneity in ￿xed characteristics x is ruled out in the following.
All x arguments are therefore omitted. Let Xt be the average of Zt−a,a in the population






where Zt,0 is the initial productivity level available to any date-t entrant. Suppose now
that an entrant at time t can start with a level of productivity that is a certain fraction
φ of the average productivity in the population:
Zt,0 = ϕXt (38)
There is no need for ϕ to be greater than one, and Xt c a nt u r no u tt ob ef a rb e l o wt h e
productivity of the set of ￿rms that account for most of aggregate output. Even if ϕ
is not large, the speci￿cation (38) will ensure that no entrant has to start from scratch
after a certain amount of growth in Xt. There will however be a lower bound on the set
of ϕ that are consistent with a steady level of entry and a stationary distribution of ￿rm
size.






This is a new equilibrium condition that can be used to solve for the growth rate ζ.T h e
right-hand side of (39) depends directly on ζ via the de￿nition of π(•|S).F u r t h e r m o r e ,
the growth rate κ of productivity in the ￿nal goods sector depends on ζ via (12). In
turn, κ determines the interest rate r and ratio of factor prices v/w via the balanced
growth conditions (4)-(8). These prices in￿uence the pro￿tability of entry and the value
of continuing operations as an incumbent, and thereby the values of S and b.
Proposition 2: Suppose the utility function is logarithmic and that the price elasticity
of the demand for diﬀerentiated goods is greater than two. Then there exists a minimum
spillover parameter ϕ > 0 so that for all ϕ > ϕ the economy has a balanced growth
path with an average technology growth rate ζ determined by (39). The growth rate ζ
and the tail index θ are increasing functions of ϕ.
The assumption on the price elasticity ensures that the mean productivity level is ￿nite
whenever mean pro￿tability is ￿nite, so that it makes sense to have spillovers of the form
(38). Because preferences over the composite commodity are taken to be logarithmic,
Assumption 1 does not depend on κ, and therefore not on ζ either. This means that
balanced growth requirements do not restrict the range of ζ.F u r t h e r m o r e ,r−κ = ρ+λ
30and so the discount rate used to de￿ne the value function V (•) also does not depend on
κ. The parameter ξ is then unambiguously decreasing in ζ. As a result, an increase in ζ
causes V (S) to decline for any ￿xed S −b. Faster technology improvements outside the
￿rm will make incumbents at a ￿xed distance above the exit barrier b less pro￿table. The
zero-pro￿t condition Γ = V (S) then implies that S−b must be an increasing function of
ζ.A ni n c r e a s ei nζ also increases θ and reduces θ∗. Using the stationary density π(•|S)
one can verify that the mean of e(s−S)(1−ω)/ω declines as a function of ζ. The equilibrium
condition (39) then implies the results of Proposition 2.
An example of the relation between spillovers, growth and the thickness of the tail
of the size distribution is given in Figure 3. The example assumes utility is logarithmic
and the price elasticity of demand is 2.5. There is no population growth, no exogenous
exit by ￿rms, and no labor-augmenting technological progress. Furthermore, Γ = M/ρ,
so that the entry cost is the same as the present value of the ￿xed costs for a ￿rm that
is never shut down. The subjective discount rate ρ is 3%, and the average growth of
productivity inside the ￿rm is zero. Its standard deviation is 20%. In this economy,
all growth is due to spillovers in the ￿nal goods sector, and the ￿gure shows that the
smallest spillover consistent with a stationary equilibrium generates a growth rate in
total factor productivity of 3%.













Figure 3: Learning-by-Doing and Spillovers
In this economy, ￿rms do not have an intensive margin along which they can aﬀect the
growth rate of their productivity. Making it easier to copy from existing ￿rms leads
31unambiguously to faster growth. Because of the shorter average life-span of ￿rms, ￿rms
will not have a chance to grow large and this makes for a size distribution of ￿rms with a
thin tail. The thick tail observed in ￿rm size data indicates that ϕ cannot be too large.
Organization capital must be relatively hard to copy.
6. Concluding Remarks
Growth in the economy described in the last section is generated by learning-by-doing in
production, and spillovers of the knowledge created in the process. Average information
about the operations of existing production units can be used by new entrants. Entry
drives up wages and thus the ￿xed cost needed to keep existing production units in
operation. This induces exit of the least eﬃcient production units. Low-productivity
production units are replaced by production units that are closer to the average in
terms of their productivity. This replacement is a source of growth beyond the growth of
productivity that occurs in existing production units. The fat tail of the size distribution
of U.S. ￿rms implies that the growth generated by entry and exit can account for only
a relatively modest part of the growth of aggregate output.
It is not diﬃcult to calculate exit rates and growth rates conditional on survival
for the economy described here. For ￿rms with a particular set of ￿xed characteristics,
exit rates are nearly zero soon after entry. They then increase to a maximum and
decline to a long-run constant exit rate. In contrast, the data suggest that exit rates of
￿rms decline monotonically with age. This monotonically declining hazard rate can be
captured in the model described here by averaging over ￿rms with heterogeneous initial
pro￿tability levels. Heterogeneity in ￿rm characteristics is also needed, in the context of
the economy described here, to interpret the empirical observation that ￿rm exit rates
are not only correlated with size but also with age. Luttmer (2004) characterizes the
heterogeneity and the average growth and variability of productivity shocks needed to
￿t the joint distribution of age and size, exit rates conditional on age and size, and
survivor growth rates conditional on age and size, as reported for U.S. manufacturing
plants by Dunn, Roberts and Samuelson (1989). The average growth and variability of
productivity growth are intimately linked to the value of a ￿rm. Given data on ￿rm
value, this provides an important over-identifying restriction for the economy described
here. Examining this restriction is the subject of ongoing research.
A potentially important extension of the economy described here is to allow for ca-
pacity constraints. One can suppose that entrants not only pay entry costs and draw
32￿xed cost and input requirement parameters, but also a maximum scale. This is an
extension that remains analytically tractable and that is likely to be useful when exam-
ining plant-level data. In particular, this extension may help in interpreting diﬀerences
between the size distributions of ￿rms and plants. It also allows one to examine an
economy in which there are categories of ￿nal goods that are perfect substitutes.
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